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MATTHEW E. LENOE
LETTER-WRITING AND THE STATE 
Reader correspondence with newspapers as a source 
for early Soviet history
AS RUSSIAN ARCHIVES HAVE EXTENDED ACCESS to their files over the last decade
historians have come upon hundreds of thousands of reader letters to newspapers,
dating back to the earliest years of Soviet history. The best-known collection is the
archive of the Central Committee’s Krest’ianskaia gazeta, held in the Russian State
Archive of the Economy. But Moscow archives also contain large collections of
letters to Rabochaia gazeta, Rabotnitsa, and Gudok (organ of the railroad workers’
labor union). Intelligence reports on popular mood (svodki) prepared for upper-
level Party officials based on letters to newspapers are also scattered throughout
Russian archives. Svodki in the files of the Central Committee and the Moscow
oblast’ (province) Party Committee, for example, include material from letters to
Pravda, Batrak, Uchitel’skaia gazeta (organ of the teachers’ union), Golos tekstilei
(organ of the textile workers’ union), and Rabochaia Moskva .1
1. The Krest’ianskaia gazeta
 
 letter archive is located in the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv
Ekonomiki (RGAE), 
 
fond 
 
396, the 
 
Rabochaia
 
 
 
gazeta 
 
and 
 
Rabotnitsa
 
 archive in Rossiiskii
Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI), 
 
fond 
 
610, and the
 
Gudok
 
 archive in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), 
 
fond
 
 9613. For
examples of intelligence reports on popular mood containing excerpts from letters to 
 
Batrak
 
,
see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 21, ll. 126-179. For 
 
svodki 
 
excerpting 
 
Uchitel’skaia gazeta
 
,
see 
 
ibid
 
., ll. 86-121; for 
 
svodki
 
 from 
 
Rabochaia Moskva
 
 and 
 
Uchitel’skaia gazeta
 
, see
Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Obshchestvennykh Dvizhenii g. Moskvy (TsGAOD g.
Moskvy), f. 3, op. 9, d. 81, ll. 103-128; for 
 
svodki
 
 based on letters to 
 
Golos tekstilei
 
, see 
 
ibid
 
., ll.
166-67. Two collections of letters published within the last year are A. K. Sokolov, ed., 
 
Golos
naroda
 
. 
 
Pis’ma i otkliki riadovykh sovetskikh
 
 
 
grazhdan o sobytiiakh
 
 
 
1918-1932 gg
 
. (Moscow:
Rosspen, 1998) and A. Ia. Livshin, I. B. Orlov, eds, 
 
Pis’ma vo vlast’
 
, 
 
1917-1927
 
: 
 
zaiavleniia,
zhaloby, donosy, pis’ma v gosudarstvennye struktury i bol’shevistskim vozhdiam
 
 (Moscow:
Rosspen, 1998).
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Like any source, the letters cannot be used effectively without an understanding
of who produced them, what their purposes were, and what conventions governed
their composition. Letter-writing to Soviet newspapers was a practice with multiple
social, political, and even economic functions. For their authors the letters were a
channel for petitions to power of all sorts, whether for restoration of rations, a trip to
Moscow, or redress of injustice. Writing letters to the papers was also a means of
proving oneself as a civic-minded activist, a morally serious person worthy of
admission to the Party. Would-be journalists wrote letters to the newspapers in
hopes of being hired on regular staff. Some authors wrote in order to express
opinions or protest the Party’s political line. Others sought to settle private quarrels
with political or criminal denunciations.
Yet whatever the motives behind them, letters to Soviet newspapers (and to
other Soviet authorities, for that matter) do not represent, except in very distorted
form, their authors’ private aspirations, opinions, or beliefs. Bolshevik Party
leaders and officials constructed the practice of letter-writing, soliciting letters
from their subjects, setting the agenda for their correspondence, coaching them on
acceptable ways to address power, and deciding which of their missives would be
published. For Party authorities the solicitation of letters was a tool of power. They
needed letters to gauge popular mood, monitor the state apparatus, educate the
uncultured masses, and facilitate the centralized distribution of goods, power, and
privileges. The ordinary Soviet subject corresponded with the newspapers inside a
frame already built by Party officials and journalists. Letters to the newspaper were
artifacts of the interaction between rulers and ruled. Although it is possible to find
in these letters indirect evidence about private political opinions, resistance to
Stalinism, and individual manipulation of the Soviet state, they have much greater
value as direct windows on the everyday functioning of Soviet society, the
instruments of power, and the ways in which agents of the Soviet state acted to
shape the public identity of their subjects.
In prerevolutionary Russia both the government and its opponents had solicited
reader letters to their press organs as part of their efforts at political education and
organization. The Tsarist state had begun using reader letters as a tool of political
education as early as 1881, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs began publishing
 
Sel’skii vestnik
 
. This was a weekly paper for peasants which ran a regular section
of reader letters. The overall purpose of the newspaper was to counteract
revolutionary propaganda in the countryside following the assassination of
Alexander II. In particular Ministry officials wanted to scotch rumors that the
government would soon divide all large landholdings up among the peasants in a
“final repartition.”
 
2
 
According to James Krukones, the editors hoped that printing reader letters
would advance the paper’s didactic mission. They instructed readers on desirable
topics for their letters, including how to raise agricultural productivity, learn a
 
2. James H. Krukones, 
 
To the people: The Russian government and the
 
 
 
newspaper
 
 Sel’skii
vestnik 
 
1881-1917
 
 (New York: Garland, 1987): 8-18.
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trade, and stay sober. They also requested information on prices and local real
estate markets. As with Soviet newspapers in later years, they strove to set an
agenda for their correspondents. The agenda was also enforceable, for the paper
would only publish on topics the editors deemed appropriate. Letters actually
printed tended toward self-improvement tips and complaints about peasant vice,
alcoholism, and general “backwardness.”
Beginning at the turn of the century Social Democratic newspapers, among
them 
 
Iskra
 
 and later 
 
Pravda
 
, published letters from worker and peasant activists.
Lenin advocated soliciting letters from ordinary manual laborers in order to collect
information about revolutionary activity all around the country, and to maintain
contact with rank-and-file revolutionaries. The practice, however, had another
function, that of political education. Workers and peasants who wrote to the
newspaper would raise their own political consciousness and their general level of
culture in preparation for leading an insurgent proletariat. Correspondence with the
newspaper, like face-to-face political study circles, was expected to be a school for
revolutionaries.
The early Social Democratic press shared with 
 
Sel’skii vestnik
 
 the goal of
“raising the cultural level of the masses,” making them more disciplined,
productive members of society. Writers to both the government and revolutionary
press addressed a tutelary authority, ostensibly the bearer of higher culture and
political consciousness. In both cases newspaper editors saw letter-writing as a tool
of education and political persuasion.
 
3
 
After the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, their new official press continued to
solicit reader letters. During the Civil War Soviet newspapers, in particular 
 
Pravda
 
and 
 
Bednota
 
, the Central Committee’s publication for peasants, encouraged readers
from “the laboring classes” to write in with denunciations of shirkers and reports on
the progress of the war effort. 
 
Bednota
 
 generally published those letters which
modeled conscientious participation in the war effort or denounced malefactors,
incompetents, and slackers. On March 18, 1919, for example, the paper ran a letter
describing how mechanics and engineers at a railroad repair shop donated a day of
work to repair 47 train cars for military use. The piece was headlined, “If everyone
just did it like this!” Published letters demonstrating enthusiasm generally fit with
some ongoing propaganda campaign, and they were often solicited. The railroad
repair story, for example, was part of a campaign to encourage workers to donate
time to repair the Bolsheviks’ locomotive park. On the same page 
 
Bednota
 
published an exhortation to readers to volunteer for transport repair work.
“Comrades!” this began, “Do not allow the enemy victory over the hungry workers.
Go to work on transport, because the fate of the country depends on transport!”
 
4
 
Alongside such motivational pieces, 
 
Bednota
 
 also printed letters that denounced
corrupt officials and described their punishment. The purpose appears to have been
both to bolster morale by showing Soviet power exposing class enemies, and to
 
3. 
 
Ibid
 
.: 138-147.
4. 
 
Bednota
 
 (March 18, 1919).
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deter would-be slackers, deserters, and saboteurs. On March 18, 1919, in the same
issue as the story about the railway mechanics’ volunteer work, the paper published
brief descriptions of corrupt Communists who had been exposed and prosecuted.
The headlines “On the black board (of shame)” ran above stories about a village
soviet chair who had engaged in “kulak speculation,” a commissar who had broken
his Lenten fast with bread made from requisitioned flour, and a former tsarist secret
police officer who had infiltrated the Cheka in Rzhevsk.
 
5
 
Bednota
 
’s editors did not simply ask readers to write, they solicited and
published letters which reinforced current propaganda campaigns. They acted to
structure the flow of information coming into their offices. At a time when Moscow
newspapers had few or no paid correspondents in the provinces, the editors had to
ensure that 
 
Bednota 
 
received material that fit into ongoing propaganda campaigns.
Unpaid letter-writers were a vital source of copy for the paper, serving as an
unofficial information network. It is particularly interesting, then, to find hints that
a high proportion of 
 
Bednota
 
’s subscribers and letter-writers were local officials,
such as village soviet chairmen, or rural “intellectuals,” such as village
schoolteachers. The paper’s audience, and its unpaid correspondents, probably did
not really represent “the people,” or “the laboring masses,” but rather local
officialdom. This pattern, in which local officials and Party activists provided the
newspaper with the kind of letters it needed, would be repeated throughout the
1920s and into the 1930s.
 
6
 
Soon after taking power the Bolsheviks began to elaborate the uses of reader
letters, gleaning from them information on popular moods and abuses by local
officials. Soviet leaders, for example, began consulting these letters for information
on the mood of particular segments of the population. Lenin set the precedent for
this practice, asking 
 
Pravda
 
 and 
 
Bednota
 
 to forward letters to him on a regular basis
 
5. Ibid.
6. Steven Coe in his 
 
Peasants, the state, and the languages of NEP: The rural correspondents’
movement in the Soviet Union, 1924-1928
 
 (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993): 76-80,
suggests that before 1924 
 
Bednota’
 
s correspondents were primarily “party members, village
officials, members of the ‘village intelligentsia’ and occasionally demobilized or on-leave Red
Army soldiers.” As evidence Coe cites efforts to recruit correspondents by 
 
Bednota
 
 editors at a
meeting of delegates of peasant Committees of the Poor (1918) and the Second All-Russian
Conference of Workers in the Countryside (1920). He also discusses efforts in 1921 by 
 
Pravda
 
and 
 
Izvestiia
 
 to get local Party organizations to appoint regular correspondents from among
their ranks. During the Civil War and after the Central Committee provided subscriptions to
 
Bednota
 
 free to most important rural institutions, including reading huts, township (
 
volost’
 
)
executive comittees, local offices of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and local political
education departments (
 
Glavpolitprosvet
 
) (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 112, d. 323, l. 9). A Central
Committee report from 1922 or 1923 (admittedly after a drastic drop in circulation from
600,000 to 50,000-100,000) described 
 
Bednota
 
 as the newspaper of rural officialdom
(RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 870, ll. 92-99). The same report noted that in the Ukraine at least
rural newspapers were delivered to local government offices and were not read by ordinary
peasants (
 
ibid
 
.: 1-4).
The same pattern of distribution and letter-writing applied to the prerevolutionary state
newspaper for peasants, 
 
Sel’skii vestnik
 
. From its founding in 1881 until 1890 over one-half of
 
Sel’skii vestnik
 
’s subscribers were township offices which received the paper for free. In 1882,
35% of all letters published in 
 
Sel’skii vestnik
 
 were identifiable as being from local officials,
priests, or schoolteachers. In 1890, 40% were (J.H. Krukones, 
 
op. cit.
 
: 253, 260-61).
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during the Civil War.
 
7
 
 Using letters to the newspaper as a gauge of popular mood,
however, was not merely an idiosyncracy of the Bolshevik leader. It was part of a
much wider-ranging effort to set up intelligence channels for monitoring the
political opinions of different social groups. Recent works by Vladlen Izmozik and
Peter Holquist indicate that while surveillance of the political moods of the
populace had precedents in earlier Russian statecraft and the practices of the
combatant powers in World War I, the Bolsheviks set about the task with particular
intensity. Within days of the October Revolution the Petrograd Party Committee
sent out questionnaires to ward authorities on the attitudes of Petrograd residents to
the Bolshevik seizure of power. Throughout 1918 Party and Soviet authorities,
including the Cheka, provincial Party committees, the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee, and the Russian Telegraph Agency, strove to set up
intelligence networks which would inform them of the public mood. In addition to
reader letters to the newspaper, the sources of information were perlustrated private
letters and reports from Party agitators, Russian Telegraph Agency correspondents,
and Cheka informers. By 1919 the preparation of 
 
svodki
 
, intelligence summaries
based on these materials, was well-established in a variety of Soviet institutional
settings. Journalism was just one of these.
 
8
 
Also during the Civil War years Soviet authorities began considering the use of
reader letters as a check on corrupt local officials. Such letters would become
known in Bolshevik parlance as “signals from the localities.” This function was
implicit in 
 
Bednota
 
’s letters reporting the prosecution of corrupt local officials, and
it was endorsed by Lenin (in his article “On the character of our newspapers”) in
November 1918 and the VIII Party Congress in March 1919. However, serious
efforts to institutionalize the use of reader letters to monitor local bureaucracies did
not begin until well into the era of the New Economic Policy.
 
9
 
By the end of the Civil War, then, the practice of soliciting reader letters had
emerged as a central part of Soviet newspaper work. The uses of reader letters by
the state apparatus which developed during this period would continue throughout
the 1920s and 1930s. From the point of view of state authorities reader letters were
 
7. For reference to Lenin’s requests for such letters from 
 
Bednota
 
, see B. S. Burkov, B. A.
Miakushkov, 
 
Vse bylo tak
 
... (Moscow: Mysl’, 1991): 11. On Lenin’s instructions to the 
 
Pravda
 
editorial board to organize a corps of regular “worker correspondents,” see 
 
The great Soviet
encyclopedia
 
 (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1974), s.v. “Worker and village
correspondents’ movement.”
8. Vladlen Izmozik, 
 
Glaza i ushi rezhima. Gosudarstvennyi politicheskii kontrol’ za
naseleniem
 
 
 
Sovetskoi Rossii v 1918-1928 gg.
 
 (SPb: Izdatel’stvo S. Peterburgskogo
universiteta, 1995): 3-43. See also Peter Holquist, “Information is the alpha and omega of our
work: Bolshevik surveillance in its pan-European context,” 
 
Journal of Modern History,
 
 69, 3
(Sept. 1997): 415-450.
9. For the VIII Party Congress’ resolution calling for a press which would expose “the crimes
of various types of persons in high posts and institutions, showing the mistakes and
shortcomings of Soviet and Party organizations,” see 
 
O partiinoi i sovetskoi pechati:
 
 
 
sbornik
dokumentov
 
 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Pravda,” 1954): 212. On Lenin’s November 1918 letter,
see Peter Kenez, 
 
The birth of the propaganda state: Soviet methods of mass mobilization, 1917-
1929
 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 49.
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instruments of political education, cultural enlightenment, surveillance of local
government officials, and intelligence collection. Letter-writing to the newspapers
was an important mechanism in the functioning of official Soviet society.
 
10
 
Instruction of worker/peasant correspondents
 
In the years 1923-1924 high circulation Soviet newspapers were organizing a
regular body of “worker and village correspondents.” These were supposed to be
ordinary working people who would write into the newspapers regularly. Officials
in the Party’s 
 
agitprop
 
 apparatus hoped that the correspondents would expose
corrupt local officials, provide information on popular moods, and help to mobilize
opinion behind the Bolshevik regime. They also hoped to use the worker and
village correspondents movement as a tool to educate a new worker/peasant
intelligentsia. In pursuit of all of these goals Soviet newspaper editors and
journalists during the 1920s and 1930s instructed their worker and village
correspondents on appropriate themes and language for their letters. A striking
example of readers’ response is in the letter archive of 
 
Rabochaia gazeta
 
 at
RTsKhIDNI, the central archive of the Communist Party. The archive contains a
large file of letters on “articles and shorts (
 
zametki
 
) by 
 
Rabochaia gazeta
 
correspondents on the question of repairing and putting into operation industrial
enterprises” from the summer and fall of 1924. Postwar reconstruction of industry
was a major theme of Party propaganda at this time, playing out in forums from
 
Rabochaia gazeta
 
 to Fedor Gladkov’s novel 
 
Cement
 
. 
 
Rabochaia gazeta
 
 requested
information about the reopening of provincial factories from its correspondents,
who responded with zeal. The file contains hundreds of letters. Typical headlines
are “Another factory opened,” “Another victory,” “Smoke rolls again from the
chimneys of three factories,” and “Another victory on the labor front.”
 
11
 
A high proportion of letter authors in this file were low level Party officials,
trade union activists, or representatives of factory management. The “worker
correspondent” Rodin, for example, was also a member of an 
 
uezd
 
 (county) Party
Committee. Other worker correspondents belonged to trade union factory
committees, 
 
guberniia
 
 (province) trade union Departments of Labor, or cooperative
administration. Some of the letters were typed, indicating that the author probably
had access to a typewriter at a government office.
 
12
 
10. By “official Soviet society” I mean the combined body of the Party, the Komsomol, the
trade unions, activist organizations such as the civil defense corps OSOAVIAKHIM, and the
state apparatus. Soviet commentators referred to this combined body as 
 
obshchestvennost’
 
, a
term which before the October Revolution had meant something like “civil society” or “public
opinion.”
11. RTsKhIDNI, f. 610, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 1-10, 15, 19-20. For documentation on 
 
Rabochaia
gazeta’
 
s instruction of its worker correspondents see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 935, ll. 26-
29. Instruction was to be provided through two “roving instructors” who would visit local
worker correspondent “circles,” as well as through individual letters and a special journal.
12. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 935, ll. 1-27, 71.
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Newspapers used a number of channels to instruct worker and village
correspondents in the 1920s. The lessons themselves were haphazard and of uneven
quality, but instructional materials were distributed widely. According to a Central
Committee Press Department survey done in late 1923, Soviet trade union and
“mass worker” newspapers used articles, conferences, individual letters, circulars,
and roving instructors to inform worker and village correspondents what and how
to write. In addition, newspapers published regular instructional journals for the
correspondents.
 
13
 
Although 
 
Pravda
 
 editor Nikolai Bukharin and editorial staff secretary M. I.
Ul’ianova (Lenin’s sister) advocated a semi-autonomous worker and village
correspondents movement for a brief period in the years 1924-1925, after 1926
official guidelines called for direct supervision of the correspondents by
Communists on local newspaper staffs.
 
14
 
 In actual practice, too, the trend in the
later 1920s and early 1930s seems to have been towards greater supervision and
instruction of correspondents. A new genre of Soviet newspaper work, “mass
journalism,” was predicated on close guidance and coordination of correspondents’
efforts by professional journalists. The goal was to channel the correspondents’
energies toward the Party’s 
 
agitprop
 
 priorities.
 
15
 
Newspaper efforts to supervise correspondents continued into the 1930s. In April
1931, for example, the Central Committee’s 
 
Orgbiuro
 
 passed a resolution calling for
involvement of worker and village correspondents in the new propaganda campaign
for “mastering technology.” Among the measures the Orgbiuro ordered were the
establishment of special “Press Sections” attached to raion (county) Party
Committees, the organization of courses to prepare worker and village
correspondents by local newspapers and Party Committees, and the publication by
Pravda of a special supplement for correspondents twice a month.16 To cite one
example of response to the Orgbiuro resolution, the central newspaper Izvestiia
moved to set up instruction of worker correspondents by its provincial news bureaus,
link its Department of Organizational-Mass Work with several factories, call regular
meetings of worker and village correspondents, use the newspaper’s journalists on
assignment outside Moscow to train the correspondents, and publish a regular section
which would review correspondents’ contributions to workplace publications.17 As
13. Ibid., ll. 1-102. Two of the instructional journals were Pravda’s Raboche-krest’ianskii
korrespondent and Rabochaia Moskva’s Put’ rabsel’kora.
14. On the shift toward direct Party supervision of the worker/peasant correspondents’
movement in 1926, see Julie Kay Mueller, A new kind of newspaper: The origins and
development of a Soviet institution, 1921-1928 (Ph.D. diss., University of California/Berkeley,
1992): 264-315.
15. On “mass journalism” (the organization of news events such as socialist competitions and
“production reviews”) as a tool for organizing worker/peasant correspondents, see Matthew
Lenoe, Stalinist mass journalism and the transformation of Soviet newspapers, 1926-1932
(Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1997), chapter 5.
16. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 114, d. 228, ll. 61-65.
17. TsGAOD g. Moskvy, f. 420, op. 1, d. 59, ll. 120-131.
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of the summer of 1931 Gudok, the organ of the railwaymen’s labor union, was
sending out “organizers” and “instructors” to lecture worker correspondents on
appropriate themes for their letters.18 In 1933 the paper was instructing worker
correspondents by means of individual letters of instruction, regular conferences, and
its journal Rabkor zheleznodorozhnik .19
The purpose of the above examples is not to suggest either that all letter-writers
were regular worker/village correspondents or that all followed the agendas which
Party authorities attempted to set. In fact, the records of Gudok cited above make a
distinction between the paper’s total of 40,000 worker correspondents” and its aktiv
(meaning roughly “the corps of activists”) of 1,500. The head of Komsomol’skaia
pravda’s letters department made the same distinction at a conference in January
1935. Members of the aktiv were in regular touch with the editors, while anyone
who had ever sent in a letter qualified as a rank-and-file worker correspondent. The
activists received more intensive and direct supervision than the one-time authors.
However, both groups were influenced by the editors’ instructions, whether
transmitted on the pages of the newspaper itself, in trade journals, at meetings, or in
individual letters.20
The practice of letter-writing as a whole was not spontaneously motivated “from
below.” Nor did letter-writers choose the topics for their letters in a vacuum. They
were often prompted “from above” so that their letters reflected the Party’s own
agenda. The orderly filing of letters by topic in the Krest’ianskaia gazeta archive at
the Russian State Archive of the Economy is evidence of this. Many of the topic
headings match the newspaper’s own thematic organization: “The alliance of
countryside and city,” “Cooperatives,” “The countryside — old and new,”
“Taxes,” “Agriculture and agronomy,” “Enlightenment,” “The Red Army,” “Our
newspaper,” “Wrecking and malfeasance on collective farms,” “On the
opposition.”21 The ability of Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s office staff to file letters this
way indicates that a high proportion of letter-writers followed the agenda set by the
newspaper. When a newspaper reader wrote a letter to the editor, s/he was
participating in a practice structured by agents of the Soviet state for state purposes.
18. GARF, f. 9613, op. 2, d. 82, ll. 1-5.
19. Ibid., d. 94, ll. 1-2ob.
20. Ibid. A report on Gudok’s work by a “brigade” of Komsomol “raiders” from 1933 noted
that individual letters of instruction were sent out only to the aktiv. Other letter-writers, the
report claimed, were reached through members of the aktiv who were supposed to run
instructional meetings, as well as through Rabkor zheleznodorozhnik and conferences
organized by the editors themselves. The report also noted that worker correspondents were
supposed to receive one ruble for each letter published, and that reporters edited letters heavily
before publication. Sometimes they even put their own byline on them, so that they received the
“honorarium” instead of the worker correspondent. For comments on Komsomol’skaia
pravda’s work with letters and correspondents, see “Stenogramma soveshchaniia zav.
massovym otdelom i otdelom rabochikh pisem tsentral’nykh gazet v Bol’shevistskoi pechati,”
Jan. 2, 1935, in the library of Komsomol’skaia pravda, Moscow, file “V. Man’kova,” TMs.
21. RGAE, f. 396, op. 1-10.
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Party leaders pushed newspapers and local Party organizations to instruct
correspondents in part because they saw the movement as a tool for the education of
a new “Soviet intelligentsia” of workers and peasants. As a number of scholars
have noted, the worker and village correspondents movement served as a kind of
“university” where young activists from the “laboring masses” learned to speak the
official language of the Soviet state. Both the organizers of the correspondents
movement and the participants were aware of this function. Newspapers instructed
correspondents in the use of the new Bolshevik vocabulary, while would-be Party
members and activists imitated official discourse in their letters and expressed their
desire to learn it thoroughly. Like Sel’skii vestnik and the prerevolutionary socialist
press, the Soviet newspapers solicited letters in part to educate their audience,
especially in correct political thinking. But writing letters to Soviet papers offered
the authors a greater potential reward, for the worker and village correspondents
movement was organized in part as a channel for upward mobility into the state
apparatus. Those letter-writers who strove to learn official language with the
ultimate goal of entering the privileged circle of obshchestvennost’ both
participated in and reinforced a state-structured discourse. Their letters did not so
much express private identity or mentalité, as a willingness to speak Bolshevik
language in exchange for the benefits distributed by the Soviet state.22
A 1925 letter to Krest’ianskaia gazeta from a 22-year old Ukrainian peasant,
Ivan Sergeevich Eroshchenko, exemplifies the readiness of would-be activists to
adopt Bolshevik language and ideological categories in order to gain a share of the
benefits offered by the state. Eroshchenko opened his letter, which he titled, “My
last call,” with a request for unspecified aid from the newspaper editors. He
continued with an account of the difficulties he had encountered in trying to remake
himself as a village correspondent and activist in his village.
“When I began to arm myself with Krest’ianskaia gazeta, I took the newspaper’s
printed page, and got knowledge for myself, and I understood what knowledge
is, and [that] knowledge is necessary for our young-newly-blooming life.
Because our essential task of youth is to construct political life in the
countryside.”23
Eroshchenko then noted that he had received Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s instructional
materials on organizing a “circle” of village correspondents, and thanked the
editors for them. Unfortunately, he was encountering difficulties in organizing
villagers to subscribe to the newspaper.
22. On the worker and village correspondents movement as a tool for educating workers and
peasants in Bolshevik language, see Jeffrey Brooks, “Public and private values in the Soviet
press, 1921-1928,” Slavic Review, 48, 1 (Spring 1989): 18-35; Michael Gorham, “Tongue-tied
writers: The Rabsel’kor movement and the voice of the ‘new intelligentsiia’ in early Soviet
Russia,” The Russian Review, 55 (July 1996): 412-429; M. Lenoe, Stalinist mass journalism,
op. cit.: 34-44.
23. RGAE, f. 396, op. 3, d. 41, ll. 49-52.
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“Recently I approached the peasantry with these questions, but it is difficult,
comrades! to organize out of the peasantry an avant-garde body of activists
(peredovoi aktiv). Because the unconscious mass of peasants. So while I was
reading them a lecture from the newspaper it discussed the question of
constructing a Soviet state, as they say, all was in order, and then, comrades!
when matters came to subscribing, to paying a subscription to Krest’ianskaia
gazeta, they became not understanding right away, and no longer activists. [...]
Well what can you do, they don’t have consciousness [...] the peasants are dark,
the peasants are illiterate [...] infected with the prayers of the priests, the
capitalists, religion.”24
Eroshchenko continued his plaint about peasant ignorance, and then explained that,
“I have come to love intensely Soviet worker-peasant power.[...] I want to achieve
great knowledge for my life, to guide the state where the government of workers
and peasants is.” After this sentence he drew a hammer and sickle. He concluded
with a request for directions to the newspaper’s editorial offices in Moscow, which
he wanted to visit.
“When you send me a letter, do not forget me, that is, do not refuse my request to
send me a map of Moscow and the editorial offices of Krest’ianskaia gazeta; and
advice, what documents I should bring with me, or what I should get on the spot.
This is because I Eroshchenko want to visit you at the editorial offices in
Moscow [...]. Dear Comrades! Don’t leave your friend Eroshchenko in the
depths in the countryside! And I want to go to stay with you at the editorial
offices so that you can arm me with knowledge. and then back again for the
struggle with darkness and ignorance! [...]
I will be a world hero of the proletarian revolution! Yes! All hail the alliance
of peasants and workers” [here Eroshchenko drew another hammer and
sickle — M. L.].25
Although more pathetic than most, Eroshchenko’s letter epitomizes the striving of
would-be Party members and activists to learn Bolshevik categories (political
consciousness, peasant ignorance, the alliance of workers and peasants) in order to
gain benefits available from the Soviet state. In Eroshchenko’s case, these were
education and a trip to Moscow. Letter-writers did not need to be beaten on the head
with instruction - they actively sought it out. In order to achieve their goal, whether
it was becoming a Communist, getting an education and a better job, or making
trouble for a neighbor, the authors understood that they had to speak in language
Bolshevik officials would understand. The Party’s near-monopoly control over the
distribution of educational opportunities, jobs, and goods made it necessary for
correspondents to learn its language.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. 
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Who wrote the letters?
A variety of evidence, both anecdotal and statistical, indicates that a high
proportion of letter-writers belonged to official Soviet society. These were Party
and Komsomol activists, members of local soviets, trade union officials, and other
authorities. A very rough estimate for the 1920s would be that one-third of writers
to the “peasant press” belonged to officialdom, as did about two-thirds for
“leading” Party and Komsomol organs like Pravda and Komsomol’skaia pravda.
According to the editors of Krest’ianskaia gazeta, as of January 1926 “almost all”
of ten new village correspondents were members of their village soviet.
Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s statisticians calculated in May 1926 that 21% of their
correspondents were teachers, and 42.5% were former Red Army soldiers, a group
with disproportionately high representation in rural government. According to the
same report, 7.5% of the newspaper’s village correspondents belonged to the Party
and an additional 20% to the Komsomol. It is worth noting that Krest’ianskaia
gazeta statistics on peasant correspondents during this period appear to have
included all letter-writers, not just “activists” who wrote regularly.26
In July of 1923 Gudok, one of the first newspapers actively to organize worker
correspondents, reported to the Central Committee Press Department that of 522
correspondents, 158 (30.3%) were labor union officials, and another 184 (35.2%)
were office workers of some kind. Only 128 (24.5%) were classified as workers. Of
the 271 correspondents whose Party status was known, 111 (41.0%) belonged to
the Party or the Komsomol. These 522 correspondents, however, were probably the
activists in regular touch with the editors, as Gudok reported receiving 105 letters a
day at this time. It is unlikely that each correspondent was writing a letter every four
to five days.27
If one can make a correlation between the social profile of a newspaper’s
readership and that of its letter authors, then most writers to Pravda and
Komsomol’skaia pravda were probably Party or Komsomol members. A 1926
survey found that 92% of Komsomol’skaia pravda’s readers belonged to the
Komsomol. Similarly, a 1929 survey found that 72% of Pravda’s readers were
Party members.28 In 1925 the Central Committee worker paper, Rabochaia gazeta,
reported that 22.9% of all readers were Communists, and 13.3% were Komsomols.
26. See Steven Coe, op. cit.: 258; Zhurnalist, 2 (February 1926): 26; 12 (December 1926): 59. I
concluded that Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s statistics on village correspondents were based on all
letters received, not just those of activists, from an examination of an April 1924 report on
letters received (see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 892, l. 13). It is of course possible that this
procedure had changed two years later.
27. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 907, l. 11.
28. Neither survey was based on a sampling of all readers. Also respondents were self-
selecting. In each case the newspaper published a questionnaire which could be cut out and
mailed in by the reader. For the Komsomol’skaia pravda survey data, see Tsentr Khraneniia
Dokumentov Molodezhnykh Organizatsii (TsKhDMO), f. 1, op. 3, d. 22, ll. 23-25. For the
Pravda data, see Gazetnoe khoziaistvo, 2 (February 1930): 14, and “Pervye itogi ankety:
chitateli o ‘Pravde’,” Pravdist, 1 (June 4, 1929).
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Communists and Komsomols thus made up more than one-third of readership for
this paper at the time.29
Data on “youth correspondents” gathered by provincial Komsomol newspapers
in the years 1926-1927 also indicated that a high proportion of letter-writers were
attached to official Soviet society. In September 1926, for example, the Kiev
guberniia newspaper Molodoi Bol’shevik received 304 responses to a
questionnaire sent to its youth correspondents (the paper calculated that it had just
over 700 total correspondents). Of the respondents, 6.9% belonged to the Party, and
a whopping 83.9% to the Komsomol. In addition 16.1% of respondents were
village soviet members, 20.4% participated in local Komsomol “Youth Councils,”
9.2% were on the governing councils of local reading huts, 9.2% worked in rural
cooperatives, and 8.6% belonged to Peasant Mutual Aid Societies.30
A local Siberian Komsomol paper, Molodaia derevnia, reported similar findings
on its youth correspondents in late 1927. According to the newspaper’s records, of
314 “regular” youth correspondents, 15 (4.8%) were Party members, 35 (11.1%)
were Party candidate members, 206 (65.6%) belonged to the Komsomol, and 58
(18.5%) were not connected with either group. Of all youth correspondents, 206, or
65.6%, were involved in some kind of “civic” work (connected with Soviet
institutions, the Red Army, the Party, or the Komsomol; 176 correspondents
(56.1%) also wrote to other newspapers besides Molodaia derevnia and 213
(67.8%) participated in the production of a hand-written “wall newspaper.”31
There is a very strong case to be made that between one-third and two-thirds of
all who wrote letters to the Soviet press in the middle to late 1920s were members of
Soviet official society (obshchestvennost’) at one level or another. This is harder to
argue for the 1930s because newspapers stopped doing studies of their readership
or the social composition of the worker and village correspondents movement.
However, scattered data exists. In August/September of 1930 Central Committee
researchers reported to the Central Committee Secretariat that most “village
correspondents” in their local surveys were young male Komsomol “cultural
plenipotentiaries” — presumably the local youth activists assigned to organize
cultural activities.32 In 1933 and 1936 the Central Committee attempted to
reorganize the press distribution system in response to reports that most central
newspapers circulated by institutional subscription to Party and Soviet officials,
rather than the “laboring masses.”33 Assuming that the profile of letter-writers
corresponded roughly to that of readers, then many correspondents must have been
Party members and/or Soviet officials.
29. Iakov Shafir, “Chitatel’ Rabochei gazety v tsifrakh,” Krasnaia pechat’, 26 (December 25,
1925): 37.
30. TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 590, ll. 32ob-33.
31. Ibid., d. 737a, ll. 29-30.
32. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 114, d. 197, l. 98.
33. On these reform attempts, see M. Lenoe, Stalinist mass journalism, op. cit.: 177-179.
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In the late 1930s letter authors continued to include a disproportionate, though
perhaps declining, number of members of official Soviet society. According to a
Krest’ianskaia gazeta article cited by Sheila Fitzpatrick, of 1,784 letters received by
the paper on two days in July 1935, “39% came from rank-and-file kolkhozniki,
10% from kolkhoz chairmen and brigade leaders, 6% from journalists from local
newspapers, 5% from kolkhoz accountants and bookkeepers, 4% from mailmen
and telephone and telegraph workers, and 4% from teachers, agronomists and other
‘local intelligentsia.’”34 Thirty-two percent of the letters in the sample remained
unaccounted for. Letters from groups clearly identifiable with obshchestvennost’,
namely the kolkhoz chairmen, work brigade leaders, local journalists, and
“intelligentsia” such as schoolteachers, made up 29% of all letters accounted for in
this survey. Assuming that all kolkhoz chairmen and brigade leaders were Party
members, at least 15% of the writers were Communists, much higher than the
percentage in the general adult population. At other newspapers the proportion of
Communists, Komsomols, and other members of obshchestvennost´ would have
been considerably higher.
Other work by Fitzpatrick suggests that in Soviet society as a whole authors
connected with official Soviet society continued to dominate the practice of letter-
writing. In two recent articles on mail sent not just to newspapers, but also to Party
leaders, prosecutorial organs, and other addresses, Fitzpatrick mentions 98 letters
with authors who are identified by occupation and/or Party status. Of these 52, or
53.0%, were written by persons who were either Communist Party/Komsomol
members or connected with official society by profession (I include a historian, a
statistician, a mathematician, and two engineers in this group). Although this is
obviously not a random sample of correspondence, it does suggest that letter-
writing continued to be predominantly a practice of Communists, Komsomols, and
Soviet officialdom in the late 1930s.35
Intelligence collection
When Central Committee Agitprop Department officials moved to set up a central
press network differentiated by audience (with a “mass worker newspaper,” a
“mass peasant newspaper,” and a “leading” newspaper, Pravda, for the Party
cadres) in the years 1922-1924, they also took steps to institutionalize the use of
reader letters as a source of information on popular moods. The first steps in this
direction were taken by editors at the Central Committee’s new “mass”
newspapers, Rabochaia gazeta and Krest’ianskaia gazeta in the early spring of
1924. In February S. B. Uritskii, a highly placed official in the Central Committee’s
34. Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Readers’ letters to Krest’ianskaia gazeta, 1938,” Russian History, 24,
1-2 (Spring-Summer 1997): 149-170.
35. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and citizens: Public letter-writing in Soviet Russia in
the 1930s,” Slavic Review, 55, 1 (Spring 1996): 78-105; “Signals from below: Soviet letters of
denunciation of the 1930s,” Journal of Modern History, 68, 4 (December 1996): 831-866.
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Agitprop apparatus and former editor of the railwaymen’s trade union paper
Gudok, wrote a letter of advice to Iakov Iakovlev, the editor of Krest’ianskaia
gazeta, the new mass peasant newspaper. Uritskii, who had had much experience
working with reader letters while at Gudok, emphasized the need to organize
peasants from all over Russia to write in to the new paper. According to him, letters
to Krest’ianskaia gazeta would help the Party to monitor popular mood in the
countryside and alleviate the oppression of peasants by local officials.
“Krest’ianskaia gazeta, the peasant megaphone, will play a colossal role; it will
constantly correct our work among the peasantry. Krest’ianskaia gazeta, the
barometer of peasant mood, will serve us in many ways and return our expenditures
on it one hundred-fold.”36
Party authorities expected that the worker and village correspondents movement
would provide them with information on popular moods. In April of 1924
Rabochaia gazeta, the Central Committee’s “worker newspaper,” held its second
“All-Union” conference of its worker correspondents. The conference passed a
series of resolutions on the tasks of worker correspondents and their role in society,
approving of Rabochaia gazeta’s organization of worker correspondents’ “circles”
at factories and workers’ clubs. In a document entitled “Bylaws of Rabochaia
gazeta worker correspondents’ circles,” the conference delegates noted the
correspondents’ duty “to register” the mood of workers, but also to “organize civic/
public opinion (obshchestvennoe mnenie)” in the interests of their class.37 From the
earliest phase of the worker correspondents’ movement, newspapers were charged
with two different and sometimes contradictory tasks in work with reader
correspondents. On the one hand, they were to solicit letters which “registered”
popular moods; on the other they were to “organize” popular opinion.
By the time of Rabochaia gazeta’s second worker correspondents’ conference,
Krest’ianskaia gazeta was already producing weekly summary reports on the
themes of reader letters. On April 7, 1924, for instance, the newspaper’s staff
forwarded to the Agitprop Department a report on the themes of the 4,876 letters
they had received between March 30 and April 7. The report laid out how many
letters had come in on topics such as “taxes,” “the exchangeable ruble,” “forests,”
“complaints against the authorities,” and so on. It also broke down the “social
situation” of the letter-writers, indicating how many were Party members,
Komsomol members, “advanced peasants,” “illiterate peasants,” and so on.38 Later,
such reports would be presented in a different format, with a series of paragraph
length quotations from reader letters. The numbers of letters on various themes was
only presented sporadically, and the social background of their writers never (the
36. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 892, ll. 21-22; d. 907, l. 11. A special “worker correspondents’
department” was set up at Gudok in late 1922 or early 1923. According to the newspaper’s
November 1923 report to the Central Committee, between 50 and 70% of each edition was
devoted to reader letters.
37. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 935, ll. 28-29.
38. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 892, ll. 12-13.
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latter information was sometimes summarized in separate reports on “the social
composition of the worker/village correspondents’ movement”).
Newspaper employees dealt with reader letters in three ways. Some letters,
usually those which fit into one of the Party’s ongoing propaganda campaigns, were
published. Letters asking for information would be sent to an “Inquiries” or “Legal
Consultation” department, while those making a complaint or accusation would be
forwarded to the newspaper’s letter investigation department, variously designated
the “Department of Investigation,” “The Worker/Village Correspondents’
Department,” or “The Bureau of Mass Work.” Ideally, newspaper staff would find
the answers to inquiries, sending them direct to letter-writers or publishing them in
the paper, and forward accusations to appropriate police or prosecutorial organs. In
reality many letters were simply discarded, archived, or lost. Of those which
remained, some were utilized as a source of direct intelligence on popular opinions,
moods and concerns. In this use of correspondence, employees of the letters
department would read correspondence, prepare reports on its contents, and
forward them to the newspaper editor, the newspaper’s sponsoring institution, or
other official instances.
The practice of using reader letters to produce reports on the attitudes of
different social groups spread throughout the central Soviet press very rapidly. By
1926 Krest’ianskaia gazeta, the Central Committee’s mass peasant newspaper, was
forwarding weekly reports on reader letters to the highest level Party leaders. The
editors of the Central Committee’s mass worker paper, Rabochaia gazeta, and its
“advanced” peasant newspaper Bednota, forwarded individual letters and probably
summary reports to the leadership. Reports from the Komsomol’s central organ,
Komsomol’skaia pravda, reached both the Komsomol and Party Central
Committees. As of early 1929, Pravda sent reports not just to the Central
Committee, but also to the Commissariat of Agriculture and members of the Party
Central Control Commission’s Presidium. By the years 1927-1928, if not earlier,
the major trade union newspapers were preparing reports based on reader letters for
their respective trade union Central Committee. Among these were the railroad
union’s Gudok, the textile workers’ union organ Golos tekstilei, the agricultural
and forestry workers’ union’s Batrak, and the teachers’ union newspaper
Uchitel’skaia gazeta. Reports from the latter two newspapers reached the Party
Central Committee apparatus as well as their own trade union central committees.
The Moscow oblast’ Party Committee received reports on reader letters from its
own organ, Rabochaia Moskva, and some provincial Party organizations also
appear to have received such reports from local papers.39
39. See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 19, ll. 136-335 for 1926-1927 reports from Krest’ianskaia
gazeta to the Party Central Committee. For letters forwarded from Rabochaia gazeta to Stalin,
see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 18, ll. 8-14, 29-30. For a 1930 reference to preparation of
summary reports on popular mood at Rabochaia gazeta, see TsGAOD g. Moskvy, f. 190, op. 1,
d. 7, l. 81ob. See also RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 19, ll. 106-110 (Bednota to Stalin, 1926),
RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 65, ll. 1-6 (Pravda to Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929), GARF,
f. 374 s.ch., op. 28s., d. 2658, ll. 402-403 (Pravda to TsKK, 1929), TsKhDMO, f. 1, op. 23, d. 587,
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During the second half of the 1920s, the highest ranking leaders of the Party,
including Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Bukharin, read the newspaper-
generated intelligence reports and letters. This was a period of heightened anxiety
for the Soviet leadership owing to a confluence of unrest at Moscow factories, a
grain supply crisis, difficult decisions about industrial investment, and a series of
foreign policy crises. Party leaders sometimes requested newspaper letter
department reports on such “topical” (zlobodnevnye) issues as “peasant attitudes to
the threat of war,” or peasant complaints about the agricultural tax. Judging from
these requests, and from the content of the intelligence reports themselves, the
Party’s leaders felt that foreign subversion, peasant resistance, intra-Party conflict,
and the erosion of their base of support among factory workers actually threatened
their rule.
Although intelligence on reader letters did reach the Party leaders, the channels
it travelled were often jerry-built, and its processing ad hoc. Krest’ianskaia gazeta
appears to have been the only newspaper regularly to forward intelligence reports
to the Central Committee executive apparatus. If Party leaders wanted information
on workers’ attitudes, for example, they had to request it. Thus, during the
industrial cost-cutting campaign of 1926, which provoked intense resentment in
Moscow factories, Stalin got his intelligence on worker response from Rabochaia
gazeta assistant editor Erlikh, who forwarded him selected reader letters and
anecdotal accounts of conversations overheard by reporters.40 A brigade of
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate investigators at the railway union organ
Gudok in 1929 found that not only were many letters held up in processing for one
to one-and-one-half months, but others were not read at all. Even though union
Central Committee officials had recently been complaining of “poor information-
processing,” they did not take the newspaper’s reports seriously. In the words of a
letter department clerk, their attitude was, “as long as you’re going to write them
up, send them along.”41
Reader letters were not the sole source for the reports on popular mood reaching
central authorities. Some reports were compiled from the anonymous written
questions usually handed in to the orator at Party, Komsomol, or trade union
meetings. Others were based on notes taken by Party agitators (agitators had to
hand their notebooks in to the Party’s Information Department at regular intervals)
or the comments of informers working for the GPU.
40.  RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 18, ll. 32-50.
41.  GARF, f. 9613, op. 2, d. 94, l. 1ob.
ll. 1-24 (Komsomol’skaia pravda to Komsomol TsK), GARF, f. 9613, op. 2, d. 94, l. 1ob
(Gudok to union TsK), TsGAOD g. Moskvy, f. 3, op. 9, d. 81, ll. 155-167 (Golos tekstilei to
trade union TsK), RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 21, ll. 86-345 (Uchitel’skaia gazeta, Batrak, to
Party TsK), TsGAOD g. Moskvy, f. 3, op. 9, d. 81, ll. 103-106 (Rabochaia Moskva to Moscow
Party Committee). For a letter to the Kazan’ newspaper Krasnaia Tatariia which made its way
into a Party Information Department report on popular moods, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85,
d. 217, l. 22.
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The proliferation of intelligence reporting on popular moods through these
clandestine methods was connected with a general contraction of the sphere
wherein open expression of opinion was possible. Thus, in late 1923 and early 1924
the Central Committee’s Agitprop Department followed the course of the conflict
between Trotskii and “the triumvirs” (Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinov’ev) in the
provinces by excerpting editorials from local newspapers and combining them in
reports on “the Party discussion.”42 Because local Party organizations had not yet
internalized the rules against “factionalism” adopted by the X Party Congress in
1921, many provincial papers ran discussions and editorials on the conflict. These
served the Agitprop Department as sources for the state of opinion within the Party.
By 1926 newspapermen were much more circumspect about openly questioning
the Central Committee’s “general line,” making the newspapers unsuitable as a
source of information on the real state of Party opinion. The contraction of the
sphere of open discourse made the Party’s intelligence-gathering task more
difficult. To put the problem another way, the Bolsheviks made their own
intelligence operations more difficult by limiting freedom of the press.
The Party was very concerned about keeping intelligence reports on popular
mood secret. This was also an aspect of the contraction of space available for open
expression of opinion. It is unclear what fear lay behind the anxiety to conceal the
existence of the reports from the general population — whether Party leaders did
not want people learning of opposition to Soviet power through any channel
whatsoever, or whether they did not want people to know that they were under
surveillance. For whatever reason, newspaper employees were sometimes censured
for leaving reports lying around on desks. In the eyes of Party leaders one of most
heinous crimes of the Trotskii-Zinov’ev Opposition was disseminating reports on
popular mood to workers and other ordinary citizens.43
In the Moscow archives open to foreign researchers newspaper reports on public
moods nearly disappear after 1933. In my own extensive search of the open Central
Committee files, I found no such reports dating from after 1929 with the exception
of a few from Krest’ianskaia gazeta on the 1936 discussion of the new Constitution.
As of 1932 the Commissariat of Agriculture was still receiving newspaper
intelligence reports, as was the railwaymen’s trade union Central Committee in
1933. I found no later newspaper intelligence reports in Moscow archives, although
admittedly my search for the 1930s was less thorough than for the 1920s. Professor
Andrei Sokolov, who first pointed out this gap in the documentation to me, suggests
that the regime no longer required information on popular mood (he used the phrase
obratnaia sviaz’, meaning a channel for “messages” from the populace to the
regime leadership) after Stalin’s revolution from above, and so the practice of
producing such reports died out. It did not die out completely, however, for
42. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 114, d. 871, ll. 3-22.
43. On the dissemination of svodki to workers as a crime against Party and state, see
RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 207, ll. 9-13. For an example of a reprimand issued to Rabochaia
gazeta employees for leaving svodki lying about the office where non-Party members could see
them, see TsGAOD g. Moskvy, f. 190, op. 1, d. 7, l. 81ob.
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between 1953 and 1961 Pravda forwarded reports on reader letters to Khrushchev,
and in 1966 the newspaper Sel’skaia zhizn’ sent a report on reader letters about
hooliganism to the Central Committee.44 
I would like to propose two hypotheses about the use of reader letters as a source
of intelligence on popular moods. Both of them should be testable by further
archival research. First, I suggest that after 1930 or thereabouts the Central
Committee leaders no longer made much use of newspaper reports on popular
moods. Such reports may not disappear entirely from the Central Committee’s
files, but they should appear with much less frequency. Second, I propose an
alternative to the hypothesis that the regime no longer needed information on
popular moods because its repressive apparatus had grown so strong. Soviet leaders
did feel a need for information on popular moods, but that they came to depend on
other sources which they considered more reliable, namely OGPU reports based on
intelligence from informers.
In this scenario, the Party would have once again created its own intelligence-
gathering problem by squeezing the sphere of open expression of opinion. It could
have done this in at least two ways: by prosecuting letter-writers who wrote to
papers with “anti-Soviet” missives and by increasing its control over regular
“worker/peasant correspondents.” This hypothesis should also be verifiable — one
would expect to find evidence in central files after 1930 that Party leaders were
reading fewer reports based on letters to the press, and more OGPU reports. One
might also expect a concomitant increase in the size of the OGPU’s informer
network. I do not suggest that svodki based on reader letters to the newspapers
disappeared after 1933 — only that Party leaders came to rely less on them and
more on intelligence from OGPU informers.45
Reader letters were problematic as sources of intelligence because their authors
were writing to authority. Letter-writers who openly opposed the regime
sometimes stated their expectation that the authorities would turn their letter over to
the OGPU.46 Obviously the fear of prosecution would affect both the tone and
content of letters to the newspapers, and at least some Party higher-ups were aware
of this difficulty. In October 1926 Iakov Iakovlev, the editor of Krest’ianskaia
gazeta and Commissar of Agriculture, forwarded Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s monthly
report on the content of reader letters to Central Committee Secretary Molotov,
44. Nicolas Werth, Gaël Moullec, eds, Rapports secrets soviétiques, 1921-1991 (Paris:
Gallimard, 1994): 50, 169, 618.
45. On the basis of fragmentary but suggestive evidence Vladlen Izmozik argues that the
Cheka/OGPU’s informer network expanded rapidly in the second half of the 1920s. At the end
of 1924 the OGPU had about 10,000 paid informers throughout the Soviet Union, including
518 in Moscow. Two years later there were over 10,000 paid informers in Moscow alone,
according to G. S. Agabekov, an OGPU agent who defected in 1930 (V. Izmozik, op. cit.: 112,
117). Another measure of the OGPU’s activity which might bear indirectly on the question of
the size of the informer network is the number of detainees brought to trial. In 1924 the OGPU
brought 12,425 to trial; in 1929, 33,757 (ibid.: 120-21).
46. See, for example, a Kiev Trotskyite’s letter to the newspaper Proletarskaia pravda in
RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 18, l. 25.
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accompanied by a scribbled note, which read in part: “ It’s too bad that we can’t use
anonymous letters, as these are the most topical (I am sending you a report on the
anonymous correspondence in any case) [...] Greetings, Iakovlev.” (Italics are
mine — M. L.) Iakovlev was well aware that the anonymous letter-writers were
more frank than those who signed.47
After 1930 greater fear of repression and Party activists’ increased efforts to use
worker/peasant correspondents to “organize” rather than “register” “public
opinion” (obshchestvennoe mnenie) trammeled letter-writers’ frank expression of
their opinions. The sphere wherein one could express one’s own political opinions
without fear of persecution had narrowed to circles of personal friends. Very few
people could be expected to express themselves openly to authority. To get even
approximately accurate intelligence on the mood and attitudes of the population,
the Soviet leaders would have had to resort to sources which “tapped” private
communications, by perlustrating personal letters and building networks of
informers.
The Soviet authorities’ dominating interest in information on opposition to their
rule also complicated the use of reader letters as an intelligence source. Persons
writing to authority must have become more and more reluctant to express
opposition to the regime as the 1920s wore on, yet Party leaders wanted to read
precisely that. In 1929 a standard disclaimer appeared on Pravda letter department
reports, stating that the intelligence therein did not reflect popular mood as a whole,
but specifically negative attitudes toward the Party and Soviet power. In short, the
Party was primarily interested in gathering information on oppositional moods. The
persons preparing reports on reader letters were aware of the bias this introduced to
their reports and wished to warn the authorities about it. But except for anonymous
missives, after 1930 letters to the newspapers must have been an increasingly poor
source of statements of opposition to the Bolsheviks or the Central Committee’s
“general line.”
To what extent did such intelligence reports influence the conduct of Party and
Soviet authorities? Evidence from the mid-to late 1920s suggests their influence
was quite weak. Bolshevik practices and political culture affected the processing
and interpretation of intelligence so that neither would contradict the Party leaders’
ideological assumptions or their sense of the acceptable range of policy options. At
the level of information processing, the authorities demanded intelligence on
opposition to Soviet power, and they got it. Whatever the popular attitude toward
the regime, the men and women working in the newspaper letter departments were
expected to unearth evidence of opposition, and they did. Also at the processing
level, the Party leaders determined what issues would be reported on. To a large
extent, they set the agenda for the reports on reader letters by requesting
information on on-going Party propaganda campaigns and other issues of concern.
In 1926 this meant the industrial cost-cutting campaign, in 1927 the threat of war
with England and the struggle with the Trotskii-Zinov’ev Opposition, in 1930 the
47. RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 19, l. 291.
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collectivization campaign, in 1933 rationing to workers, in 1936 the discussion of
the new Constitution.
Party leaders’ ideological preconceptions affected their interpretation of
intelligence. Between 1926 and 1929, for example, the prevailing interpretation of
letters opposing Soviet power was that they reflected the politically immature,
“unconscious” attitudes of ignorant peasants and the “petty bourgeois” mores of
artisans and the “vulgar,” “declassed” urban masses — clerks, casual day laborers,
telephone operators, shop girls and the like. The complaints and problems of the
populace were thus reduced to the proposition, “class determines political
consciousness.” The letters then became nothing more than an indication that the
Party needed to press forward even faster with its project of industrializing the
USSR and turning the various backward segments of the population into forward-
thinking proletarians. This kind of thinking enabled the Central Committee leaders
to dismiss a long compilation of peasant complaints about the injustice of the
agricultural tax in kind submitted to Molotov by Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s “Legal
Consultation” department in 1927. In his introduction to the report, the head of the
department, Mazel’, offered Molotov a ready-made explanation for the peasants’
angry attacks on the tax and its administration. “The complainant in most cases is
not in a condition to understand what the situation is, he complains exclusively
about the [tax’s] effect [...] but the basic reasons which create this effect, so
unpleasant for him, are beyond his understanding.” To paraphrase, peasants were
too ignorant to understand the necessity of paying taxes.48
In the years 1926-1928 newspaper intelligence reports showed a high degree of
discursive instability in Soviet society. In particular peasants and lower level Party
activists were not getting the Party’s message. In a file of over 500 letters collected
by Krest’ianskaia gazeta on the Trotskii-Zinov’ev Opposition, for example, 23.9%
of writers opposed or doubted the Central Committee’s “general line.” Elsewhere I
have argued that the discursive instability revealed in reader letters helped catalyze
the transformation of the tone and content of the Soviet press which occurred
between 1927 and 1930. From a relatively nuanced presentation of Party policies,
the central Soviet newspapers switched over to shrill, emotional attacks on “class
enemies.” These attacks were designed to appeal to relatively uneducated, semi-
literate readers, to mobilize them against real or imaginary enemies with angry
rhetoric they would understand. Reader letters did contribute to this change, but they
did so only by reinforcing the preconceptions of certain powerful Party leaders and
newspaper editors (notably Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Rabochaia gazeta
editor Nikolai Smirnov) that worker and peasant audiences were simple-minded and
only able to understand appeals to class hatred and envy. The gut-level emotional
convictions of Party leaders were at least as important as “objective” intelligence in
determining the “dumbing down” of the Soviet central newspapers.49
48. Ibid., l. 149.
49. Matthew Lenoe, “Reader response to the Soviet press campaign against the Trotskii-Zinov’ev
Opposition, 1926-1928,” Russian History/Histoire russe, 24, 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1997): 89-116.
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Denunciation and monitoring the state apparatus
Like the worker and village correspondents movement and the preparation of
reports on popular moods, the use of denunciatory letters (“signals from the
localities”) to monitor the state apparatus was institutionalized in the years 1923-
1924. Although Party leaders had discussed using worker correspondents to expose
corruption and incompetence in the bureaucracy during the Civil War, it was only
in the third year of the NEP that central “mass newspapers,” such as Rabochaia
Moskva and Rabochaia gazeta set up their own “Investigative Bureaus” which
handled denunciatory letters.50 At these bureaus employees sorted letters and
forwarded those they deemed actionable to appropriate authorities for further
investigation. Typical destinations included the Moscow guberniia state
prosecutor’s office, the GPU, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD), the
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, or the Central Control Commission, the
organization responsible for purging the Party of malcontents.
By 1925 the practice of forwarding denunciatory letters to local prosecutors’
offices was well-established, at least in Moscow guberniia. For that year the
guberniia prosecutor’s office reported opening 801 investigations based on letters
sent to Moscow newspapers. Of this total 208, or over one-quarter, dealt with
beskhoziaistvennost’, a catchall term for financial mismanagement. The number
two and number three categories were embezzlement by officials (109 cases) and
violations of labor laws (104 cases). According to the prosecutor’s office 268 of the
letters, or 33.5% of the total, were forwarded by Rabochaia Moskva, 112 (14.0%)
by the guberniia’s peasant newspaper Moskovskaia derevnia, 111 (13.9%) by
Pravda, 104 (13.0%) by Rabochaia gazeta, and 206 by other papers. As of March
1926 investigation was complete in 408 of the 801 cases from 1925. Of these the
prosecutor had confirmed charges made by worker correspondents in 273 cases, or
34% of the total.51
As Sheila Fitzpatrick points out in a recent article on Soviet denunciations in the
1930s, a writer often sent the same denunciatory letter to a number of different
agencies at once. This was because, Fitzpatrick notes, “there was really no
50. On Lenin’s 1918 article, “On the character of our newspapers,” which urged
newspapermen to “expose the unfit” and unmask the “actual malefactors” who disrupted
production and political work, see Peter Kenez, The birth of the propaganda state. Soviet
methods of mass mobilization, 1917-1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985):
49. The VIII Party Congress, meeting in March 1919, also endorsed the use of worker and
village correspondents to monitor the bureaucracy and expose abuse of power (see O partiinoi i
sovetskoi pechati: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo “Pravda,” 1954): 212). On the
investigatory bureaus at Rabochaia gazeta and Rabochaia Moskva, see “Revoliutsionnaia
zakonnost’ i rabkory. Prokuratura i rabkorovskoe dvizhenie,” Put’ rabsel’kora, 1 (March 15,
1926): 9-10. The Moscow guberniia prosecutor’s office reported receiving denunciatory letters
from both these papers, as well as Pravda, Moskovskaia derevnia (the guberniia peasant paper),
and other organs. By 1923 Gudok also had a “Worker Correspondents’ Bureau” and was
instructing its correspondents to expose “shortcomings,” describing when each incident
occurred, why it occurred, and who was responsible (see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 60, d. 907, l. 4).
51. “Revoliutsionnaia zakonnost’ i rabkory...,” art. cit.: 9-10.
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substantive difference between sending a denunciation to a newspaper and sending
it to the NKVD or some other official agency.”52 The practice of writing
denunciatory letters to the press can be treated by the historian as continuous with
that of writing to public prosecutors, the secret police, or even Stalin himself.
Fitzpatrick points out that letter-writers often manipulated the practice of
denunciation for their own benefit. An ambitious peasant might denounce the
chairman of his collective farm in hopes of becoming chief himself. Scholars
denounced their opponents within academe for political crimes or other offenses.
People of all social strata would denounce neighbors in hopes of getting hold of
their apartments (Fitzpatrick recognizes this as an entire genre in itself — “the
apartment denunciation”).53 In all of these cases an individual or individuals
attempted to utililize the state’s surveillance mechanisms for their personal gain.
Just how “vulnerable to manipulation” was the Soviet state? One measure of this
is the percentage of denunciatory letters that resulted in disciplinary or judicial
action against the denounced. Fitzpatrick cites Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s claim in
1935 that as the result of 746 letters sent to outside investigative organs, 103
persons had been “dismissed, prosecuted, or otherwise punished, and in 110 cases
the accusations had been found to be groundless.”54 Roughly speaking, one in
seven letters eventually elicited punishment of the denounced. However, this
estimate does not include the first “filter” that letters passed through — the
newspaper’s letter department. We do not know how many letters of denunciation
the department received but did not forward for investigation.
Scattered figures from other papers indicate that Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s
punishment rate was probably on the high end of the scale. Different newspapers
handled letters with varying degrees of care. In early 1929 Gudok, for example,
received 500 to 550 reader letters per day, of which about 170 were channeled to
the Bureau of Investigation. Approximately one-third of all letters received, then,
were denunciations of one “disorder” or another.55 In the first three months of 1929
Komsomol “raiders” reported that between 10 and 14% of all letters received by
Gudok were “sent on for investigation.” This would be approximately 50 to 75
letters per day, or, in round numbers, 30 to 45% of the 170 denunciatory letters.56
As we have seen, Krest’ianskaia gazeta reported that in 1935 about one in seven
denunciatory letters (14%) forwarded to investigative authority resulted in
punishment for the denounced. Assuming that Gudok had a similar rate in 1929,
then the percentage of all denunciatory letters which elicited punishment of their
52. S. Fitzpatrick, “Signals from below...,” art. cit.: 835.
53. Ibid.: 853-856. Fitzpatrick cites three “apartment denunciations” in this article.
54. Ibid.: 859. The quotation is from Fitzpatrick.
55. This squares well with Golfo Alexopoulos’ finding, cited in S. Fitzpatrick, “Readers’
letters...,” art.cit., that 31% of the letters in a single opis’ of the Krest’ianskaia gazeta archive
(1938) were denunciations of “abuses.” It does not, however, square so well with
Krest’ianskaia gazeta’s report in July of 1935 that only 11% of letters were denunciations (also
cited in S. Fitzpatrick, “Readers’ letters”).
56. GARF, f. 9613, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 2-2ob.
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targets would be between 30% X 14% = 4.2% and 45% X 14% = 6.3%. Perhaps one
in twenty denunciatory letters sent to Gudok (5%) ultimately hit its target.
The scattered numbers available corroborate the data from Krest’ianskaia gazeta
and Gudok, and imply that rates of investigation and punishment on denunciatory
letters were comparable from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s. For example,
statistics on the disposition of denunciatory letters are available for Izvestiia’s
Investigative Bureau for the three months from November 1926 through January
1927. In February 1927 the newspaper’s editorial staff reported channeling 2,596
letters to the Investigative Bureau. Nearly all of these presumably involved
denunciations, because other types of letters were sent to other departments (most
went to the Legal Consultation Department which handled 2,848 legal inquiries
during the same time period). Of the 2,596 presumed denunciations, the
Investigative Bureau reported actually looking into 780 cases, or 30%. As of January
25, 1927, these cases had resulted in the exposure of 73 “crimes,” ranging from
murder to “shortcomings in the Soviet apparatus.” As of this date, then, 2,596
denunciatory letters had resulted in some form of punishment for the accused in 73
cases, or 2.8% of the total (included in the category “punishment” are 22 cases which
were simply publicized in the newspaper and 20 in which “claims were satisfied”).
Of the 708 forwarded letters, about 9% resulted in some punishment for the accused.
An additional 145 letters had been sent to outside prosecutorial organs for further
action. Even assuming that every one of these 145 cases resulted in punishment for
the denounced, 218 out of a total of 2596 letters (8%) would have hit their target.57
In 1928 and 1929 the Rostov-na-Donu paper Molot also claimed to investigate
about one-third of all denunciations received, the same proportion as Izvestiia and
Gudok. According to a report in the Central Committee’s trade journal for
newspapermen, Zhurnalist, the Bureau of Investigation at Molot received about
22,000 letters between May 1928 and May 1929. Of these the Bureau looked into
8,500, or 39%.58 Other papers seem to have investigated a much lower proportion
of denunciations received. For example, the Moscow oblast’ peasant paper
Moskovskaia derevnia in 1925 and 1926 sent out only 4.5% of all letters received
for investigation. Assuming that approximately one-third of the paper’s
correspondence was denunciations (this proportion seems to have been fairly
constant for Soviet papers in this period), then Moskovskaia derevnia was
forwarding only 14% of such letters for investigation.59
57. GARF, f. 1244, op. 1, d. 22, l. 15.
58. Zhurnalist, 4 (February 1930): 127.
59. Put’ rabsel’kora, 17-18 (November 30, 1926): 7-8. At about the same time Rabochaia
Moskva reported investigating only 280 out of 2,429 letters received. Assuming that one-third
of these were denunciations (810), then the newspaper was investigating 35% (see Put’
rabsel’kora, 13 (September 15, 1926): 31. For many newspapers the proportion of all
correspondence which was denunciations was about one-third. Gudok reported this proportion
in 1929. Golfo Alexopoulos found that 50 out of 162 files (31%) from the Krest’ianskaia gazeta
archive for the year 1938 included denunciations (see S. Fitzpatrick, “Readers’ letters...,” art.
cit.: 8).
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Data from the years 1924-1935 suggests, then, that newspapers in the decade
between 1925 and 1926 were forwarding between 14 and 40% of the denunciatory
letters they received to investigative organs. At Izvestiia in 1926-1927, 9% of all
forwarded letters resulted in punishments; at Krest’ianskaia gazeta in 1935 the
corresponding number was 14%. Assuming a high forwarding rate of 40% and a
high punishment rate of 14% on forwarded letters gives a net punishment rate of 6%
on all denunciatory letters. Overall punishment rates may have been well under 5%. 
As Fitzpatrick points out, writing a denunciation was like playing the lottery.
Given the relatively low chances of success, skepticism is warranted about claims
that writers of manipulative denunciations were commandeering the state apparatus
for their own personal purposes. The state’s agents were, rather, commandeering
personal interests in the service of their agenda of surveillance, control, and
political education. Soviet subjects who denounced their fellows strengthened the
state’s surveillance mechanism. When they wrote their denunciation, they had no
idea if it would bring any positive results, or if it might even rebound against them.
Investigations were conducted in secrecy, jurisdictional boundaries between
prosecutorial organs were unclear, and neither denouncer nor denounced had
clearly defined rights of appeal. When combined with the Bolshevik mania for
secrecy, bureaucratic chaos actually contributed to the state’s dominance of its
subjects by making the process of investigation opaque.
Numerous reports on newspaper handling of letters show how disorganization
and staff inability to deal with a high volume of correspondence contributed to the
“lottery” aspect of denunciation. At Gudok in 1929 a brigade of Komsomol
investigators reported that processing of letters was often delayed for one to one-
and-one-half months. Just over two-thirds of letters were simply thrown out
(zabrakovano). The brigade found many unread letters in the files of Gudok
employees.60 At Izvestiia the Bureau of Investigation explained in an early 1927
report that relatively few denunciatory letters were confirmed because such letters
were forwarded to prosecutorial offices, where they were in turn forwarded to
“lower level organs which are often careless.”61 A 1934 article in the Central
Committee’s trade periodical for journalists, Bol’shevistskaia pechat’ scourged the
provincial paper Gorkovskaia kommuna for its careless handling of reader letters,
especially denunciations. The article described how secretaries at the paper simply
threw away a letter denouncing local officials who had closed a workers’ club.
Those “guilty” of closing the club were only punished after the denouncer sent a
copy of the letter to a local paper. Bol’shevistskaia pechat’ claimed that from the
entire year of 1933 4,000 letters remained formally classified as “under
investigation,” but at least half of these were in fact lost.62
60. GARF, f. 9613, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 2-2ob.
61. Ibid., f. 1244, op. 1, d. 22, ll. 17-19.
62. Bol’shevistskaia pechat’, 2-3 (February 1934): 44-45. For further descriptions of
newspaper editorial office mishandling of reader letters, see Zhurnalist, 4 (February 1930):
122; 11-12 (June 1930): 31.
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A paradox characterized the Party press’ handling of reader correspondence and
the worker/village correspondence movement. Party leaders and agitprop officials
pressed newspapers to supervise correspondents closely, answer every single letter
received, and follow up on denunciations and complaints. Yet the processing of
correspondence was often haphazard and chaotic. The secretaries handling letters
were often overwhelmed by the volume of correspondence. A denouncer’s chance
of eliciting punishment of the denounced was only one in ten or one in twenty.
From the point of view of the letter author this chaos made denunciation a roll of the
dice, not a legal process with well-defined stages and channels of appeal. The net
effect must have been to induce a sense of powerlessness vis-a-vis the state. From
the point of view of higher-level agents of the state, this chaos may not have been
desirable, but neither did it disable the mechanisms for “enlightenment” and
surveillance of the populace.
Persons who denounced local officials to higher authorities were forced to speak
in the language of the Soviet state, couching their accusations in Bolshevik terms.
To accuse corrupt officials of being former kulaks, priests, Mensheviks, or other
“class enemies,” denouncers had to learn the language and ideological categories of
Bolshevism. In writing up their accusations, denouncers only strengthened the
Bolshevik ideological monopoly in written communication. By repeating
Bolshevik categories, metaphors, and rhetoric in their letters, denouncers
demonstrated and reinforced the power of the Soviet state. In addition to political
control, then, denunciation fulfilled functions of “enlightenment,” in the sense of
propagating the tenets of Bolshevism.
A February 1934 article, “The worker and village correspondents’ movement at
a new level,” in Bol’shevistskaia pechat’ celebrated this process. According to this
piece, the “political content” of correspondents’ letters had recently become more
sophisticated. In the past, it explained, correspondents had focused on “trivial
facts,” “their own personal issues,” but now more of them denounced “distortions
of the Party line,” discussing life on the collective farms in terms of the tasks set by
the state, and analyzing “the root” of local disorders using Marxist-Leninist
categories. Bol’shevistskaia pechat’ cited the exemplary development of one
collective farm worker, Matrena Chernysheva, a 50-year-old woman who had
begun writing to the newspaper in 1930.
“At first she wrote that the collective farm chairman had gone to town on one of
the farm’s horses to buy wine. Now she writes that the class enemy in
the collective farm is growing stronger, that he is stealthily destroying the
collective farm (her own expresssion) and etc. She writes that the class enemy
relies primarily upon the collective farm’s horse, that the horse has been
‘appropriated.’”63
63. Ibid.: 16-18.
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Petitioning for benefits
Along with surveillance, education, and control of the state apparatus, a fourth
important function of letter-writing in Soviet society was adjusting the state’s
distribution of goods and favors. Petitions for increased salaries or rations, the
restoration of political rights, or the reversal of some administrative decision were
common letter genres. These requests smoothed the functioning of the state’s
central distribution mechanism, warning officials which groups might be
dissatisfied with their share of the pie. Soviet newspapers, especially trade union
organs, provided readers with information on rationing categories, wage scales,
disability insurance, and other forms of state-dispensed benefits. Readers in their
turn wrote to the newspapers to request further information on their entitlements or
petition for an upgrade. These practices were part of the establishment of a
“hierarchy of consumption” (Elena Osokina’s phrase) in the Soviet Union in the
late 1920s and the early 1930s. During this period higher Bolshevik authorities
used their control over legal distribution mechanisms to channel salary funds and
goods of all sorts to favored social groups - Party members, Red Army units, skilled
factory operatives, the GPU, and technical specialists. Reader letters to the
newspapers were an integral part of the functioning of this hierarchy of
consumption.64
The archive of the railwaymen’s trade union organ Gudok bulges with requests
from union members for benefits information and/or upgrades. These are a valuable
and as yet unutilized source on the functioning of the Soviet rationing and
distribution systems and their effects on the psychology of ordinary Soviet subjects.
The letters reveal a workforce fragmented by resentment of those higher in the
“hierarchy of consumption,” frightened by the specter of starvation, frustrated by
powerlessness in the face of management abuses, and ready to blame “wreckers”
among local officials for their difficulties. In many cases the newspaper appears to
have been the workers’ only avenue of appeal against exploitation and injustice.
A typical letter came from a group of information booth attendants employed at
Leningrad’s Vitebsk railroad station. It was dated May 30, 1934. The agents
complained that their pay and rations were too low given the difficulty of their job,
which involved dealing with irate or frantic passengers, knowing the railway’s
regulations and fares, and memorizing railroad maps. They protested that they
made only 113 rubles 52 kopecks per month with a second-category ration card,
while cashiers in the “Commercial Department,” whose job required “no special
qualifications,” were paid 150 rubles. On these wages, they wrote, they could not
physically sustain shouting into the telephone for eight hours a day. Although the
agents had petitioned the Commissariat of Transportation for a raise to 150 rubles
per month, citing a Commissariat administrative order from 1929 which entitled
64. On the “hierarchy of consumption,” see Elena Osokina, Ierarkhiia potrebleniia (Moscow:
Izdatel’stvo MGU, 1993).
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them to pay in the “highest qualified” category, their request had been turned down.
They now asked Gudok to pursue the matter.65
The paper’s letters department forwarded the agents’ complaint to the railway
workers’ union Central Committee together with a standard form requesting an
investigation. The union Central Committee in turn notified the information booth
attendants in Leningrad that it was not possible to raise their wages, given a freeze
in wage levels ordered by “directing organs,” presumably the Commissariat of
Transportation.66
Pravda forwarded a similar complaint to the Gudok letter department on July 22,
1933. In this letter a mechanic named N. I. Fadeev who repaired watering
equipment at the Vereshchagino station in Perm province asserted that unskilled
laborers at his depot were making higher wages than he was. After Gudok
forwarded this protest to the railwaymen’s labor union, the union Central
Committee (TsK) sent a reply to Fadeev informing him that nothing could be done
until the general wage contracts were made up for 1934. Then, the TsK stated, the
issue of wage scales for different occupational groups would be reviewed. Like the
information booth attendants, Fadeev voiced resentment of another occupational
group making more money. He also made a similar appeal to written regulations,
but as in the attendants’ case, this was in vain.67
In some cases, however, action was taken to redress an injustice. In October
1933 locomotive mechanics based in Simferopol’ wrote to Pravda with a complaint
that they had never received prize money for winning a nationwide competition for
“best shock-worker/mechanics’ brigade.” The mechanics suspected that their
brigade leader, Shamara, had embezzled the prize money, but Gudok investigators
found that payment was held up inside the railwaymen’s union Central Committee
apparatus. The paper then published a story on the incident calling for the Central
Committee to punish “those workers who have a bureaucratic attitude towards
shock work and socialist competition, and to ensure immediate payment to the
mechanics’ brigade [...].”68
Growing frustration with delays in wage payments and breakdowns in the
distribution system made railroad workers ripe for the scapegoating of local
officials as “wreckers.” Five workers from Lebiazhev Station in Perm province
wrote a short piece to Gudok entitled “Who is responsible for this?” The letter ran
in part as follows
“At Lebiazhev Station this is what is happening with supply of the workers.
During March we did not receive our rations. Only one-quarter of the allotment
was distributed to the workers. The head of the Party Committee blames it on the
higher administrative organs, but they give us no answer. We are getting ten
65. GARF, f. 9613, op. 2, d. 93, ll. 4-9.
66. Ibid., ll. 1-1ob.
67. Ibid., d. 89, l. 1-2.
68. Ibid., l. 99ob.
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kilograms of flour per month for each worker here, and for the wife and
children — four kilograms. How can a worker live? At least they might give it to
us on time. We ask the editors of Gudok to send a brigade to us to investigate
who it is who is wrecking. It’s a bad business.”69
In 1933 the Central Committee of the railwaymen’s union was very concerned with
the effect of supply breakdowns on workers’ morale. The Gudok letters department
forwarded regular reports on “letters of railroad workers on the supply situation.”
As with other reports on popular moods, these were supposed to be secret, and were
marked “Confidential” (ne podlezhit oglasheniiu). These reports were a litany of
complaints about delays in wage payments, low salaries, inadequate rations, and
denunciation of other occupational groups who were better paid or supplied.
Lurking in the background was a real fear of starvation. In a typical letter excerpted
for one report, switchmen demanded transfer from category three to category one
rations. 
“We receive ten kilograms of flour, plus four for our family, and besides what
there is in the [worker] cafeteria, nothing more. It is impossible to live. Workers
with big families already have swollen bellies. We asked the county (raion)TPO
to put us in category two at least, but they told us they couldn’t. How to
continue? A switchman gets 48 rubles and even that is late. April is already
nearly over, and we still don’t have our March salaries. We, the switchmen, ask
Gudok to advise us how we are to survive (kak nam dal’she zhit’).”70
Petitions to Gudok regarding wages, benefits, and rations are a rich source for the
study of central distribution mechanisms in the early USSR and their effects on the
psychology of Soviet subjects. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, the Party’s
establishment of a hierarchy of consumption seems to have fragmented the
workforce into a large number of different occupational groups competing for
bigger handouts from the state. Breakdowns in supply as well as malfeasance by
enterprise managers and local officials frustrated workers and made them tinder for
agitprop campaigns scapegoating lower level authorities for shortages and other
systemic problems.
As with other genres of letters, petitions for improved pay or benefits are an
excellent source for studying the relationship between rulers and ruled, between the
agents of the state and their subjects. They reveal how the Soviet state’s centralized
distribution mechanisms shaped the attitudes of Soviet subjects towards political
authorities and other occupational groups. The resentment, jealousy, and fear thus
generated (whether deliberately or not) primed the populace to accept scapegoating
campaigns against middle-level officials and other “enemies of the people.”
69. Ibid., l. 239.
70. Ibid., l. 236.
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Conclusion
Scholars to date have taken two distinct approaches to reader letters and the practice
of letter-writing. Sheila Fitzpatrick and Sarah Davies have emphasized letter-
writers’ manipulation of the state for their own purposes, their attempts to lay claim
to certain legal rights, their employment of official rhetoric in subversive contexts,
and their persistent use of “traditional,” prerevolutionary cultural categories. In
short, Davies and Fitzpatrick see the letters as sites of resistance to and exploitation
of the state apparatus. It is incontestable that some letter-writers did try to
manipulate the state, did subvert official rhetoric, and did lay claim to legal rights.71
The letters, however, must be used with caution in any attempt to gauge readers’
“real” opinions independent of official ideology. Two strategies are possible, and to
their credit Fitzpatrick and Davies employ them. In her Popular opinion in Stalin’s
Russia, Davies “triangulates,” taking her bearings not just on reader letters to
authority, but also on sources tapping more private communications, in particular
Party and NKVD intelligence based on informers’ reports. Fitzpatrick does the
same in her recent study of collective farms under Stalinism, Stalin’s peasants.
Both Fitzpatrick and Davies also employ a second strategy, seeking anomalies in
the letters — words or phrases which were not part of official discourse, or
important elements of official discourse which are missing from the letters.
Fitzpatrick, for example, notes the “infrequency of even a perfunctory bow to the
Stalin cult” in peasant letters to Krest’ianskaia gazeta in 1937-1938, citing it as
evidence of peasant hatred of the dictator.72 Davies observes that some letter-
writers in the later 1930s used the word batiushka, a prerevolutionary apellation for
the Tsar which never appeared in official discourse, to refer to Stalin. This suggests
that “traditional” prerevolutionary attitudes toward patriarchal authority persisted
into the late 1930s.73
The second approach to reader letters follows the way in which Party officials,
newspapermen, and other agents of the Soviet state used letter-writing as a tool to
shape the public identity of Soviet subjects. Scholars who have taken this route
include Jeffrey Brooks, Michael Gorham, and Steven Coe.74 All three authors
discuss the role of the worker and village correspondents movement in the
education of Party activists and a new Soviet intelligentsia. Coe also devotes space
to the processing of denunciations by Krest’ianskaia gazeta. But the other aspects
of letter-writing as an instrument of state power — the collection of intelligence on
71. See Sarah Davies, Popular opinion in Stalin’s Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997); S. Fitzpatrick, “Signals from below...,” art.cit.; id., “Supplicants and citizens: public
letter-writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s,” Slavic Review, 55, 1 (Spring 1996): 78-105; id.,
“Readers’ letters...,” art. cit.; id., Stalin’s peasants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
72. S. Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s peasants, op. cit.: 295.
73. S. Davies, op. cit.: 158.
74. See Jeffrey Brooks, art. cit.; S. Coe, op. cit.; M. Gorham, art. cit.: 412-429.
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popular moods and the adjustment of distribution mechanisms — have not yet been
examined.75
The study of letter solicitation and letter-writing as a tool of state power
deserves attention. Certainly the practice involved an element of compromise/
contest between authors and state officials, as for example when the Party adjusted
its agitprop campaigns based on the content of letters, or when Gudok published an
article attacking labor union officials for failure to pay prize money to a brigade of
shock workers. But in the end the relation between state and subject was radically
assymetrical. It was agents of the state who defined the terms of discussion, decided
which letters would be published, and determined which denunciations to act upon.
A Soviet subject who wrote to the newspaper with an opinion about Party policy or
a denunciation of some local “disorder” provided information useful to the state but
had no guarantee of meaningful official action in response. When letter authors
expressed opinions about policy, Party response, if any, was generally limited to
changes in the tone or content of agitprop campaigns. Letters to the newspapers
were not part of a public exchange of opinion. Most correspondence and the
intelligence summaries based on it were kept secret. Knowledge of “popular mood”
was meant to be a monopoly of Party officials.
In legal cases, the flood of letters to the newspapers was due to the absence of
other well-defined channels for appeal. Moreover, the person who wrote a
denunciation had only a small chance of securing punishment of its target. Indeed,
as Sheila Fitzpatrick suggests, there was a roughly equal chance that the
denunciation would rebound against its author.76 The chaos in the handling of
reader letters and their frequent loss or disappearance into newspaper archives
made this channel of appeal even more opaque and its outcomes arbitrary.
Party authorities also solicited letters from worker and village correspondents in
order to instruct them in Bolshevik language and ideology. Through written and
oral interaction with newspaper editors, “instructors,” and Party agitators, activists
would master the language of the Soviet state. The Bolshevik leaders conceived of
the correspondents movement as a classroom in which rank-and-file members of
the Party or the Komsomol would learn Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, not just
activists eager to learn official language, but even denouncers attempting to put the
state apparatus to their own uses were forced to use official rhetoric and
sociopolitical categories to achieve their goals. Those who wished to manipulate
the Bolshevik state had to speak its language. Even those with subversive intent
ended up propagating official ideology.
As revelations of resistance to the state or the persistence of prerevolutionary
worldviews among the Soviet populace, letters to Soviet newspapers are
problematic, requiring careful reading and comparison with other sources. But they
75. With the exception of my forthcoming article on “Reader response to the Soviet press
campaign against the Trotskii-Zinov’ev opposition,” art. cit., which includes a short discussion
of the use of letters to the newspapers to prepare reports on popular moods.
76. S. Fitzpatrick, “Signals from below...,” art. cit.: 859.
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are a clear window on the functioning of the Bolshevik state and the relationship
between Bolshevik officials and their subjects. The letters reveal how Soviet
officials shaped the public identity of their subjects through instruction of worker
and village correspondents, the establishment of a “hierarchy of consumption,” and
the use of denunciation as a tool of governance. They are a superb and largely
untapped source of information on the everyday practices of state control in the
USSR.
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